In 1997, the French government put into effect a law that permanently exempted young French male citizens born after Jan 1, 1979 from mandatory military service while still requiring those born before that cutoff date to serve. This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of peacetime conscription on education and labor market outcomes. Results indicate that conscription eligibility induces a significant increase in years of education, which is consistent with conscription avoidance behavior. However, this increased education does not result in either an increase in graduation rates, or in employment and wages. Additional evidence shows conscription has no direct effect on earnings, suggesting that the returns to education induced by this policy was zero.
Introduction
There has been considerable interest in analyzing the consequences of compulsory military service on a wide array of outcomes. These include earnings (Angrist 1990; Angrist & Krueger 1994; Angrist & Chen 2011) , education (Card & Lemieux 2001) , crime (Galiani et al. 2011; Lindo & Stoecker 2013) and health outcomes (Bedard & Deschenes 2006 , Conley & Heerwig 2012 . This is in part due to the general policy interest in understanding shocks that are expected to have large and persistent long run effects on outcomes. Indeed, conscripted individuals are obliged to serve in a crucial time of their lives, usually characterized by critical human capital investments. Moreover, the mechanics underlying these early adulthood shocks are themselves of considerable interest. For example, the military service and disruption caused by conscription may directly have long run effects on labor market outcomes. Alternatively, conscription may instead affect long run outcomes through its effect on educational attainment, since continuing one's education can typically allow one to defer mandatory military service. Finally, understanding the effects of compulsory military service has direct policy implications for countries that still have such policies in place.
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This paper focuses on the effects of a peacetime conscription shock on the education and labor market outcomes of young French males. Prior to 1997, all French male citizens had to undergo a 10 month compulsory military service at the age of 18. A lot of men preferred to defer their service, and the best way to do so was by staying enrolled in an educational institution. In 1996, the French government announced that people born after January 1, 1979 were no longer required to enlist, while those born prior to that were still required to do so. This enables me to use a regression discontinuity design framework that compares across cohorts that were barely subject to or exempted from mandatory military service.
Since there is no reason to believe the outcomes of these groups would have been different absent this conscription policy, this research design allows me to overcome the selection bias in who is deemed physically and mentally fit for military service.
Results indicate that males born just before January 1, 1979 acquire on average half a year of education more than those born just after January 1, 1979, which is consistent with draft avoidance behavior. Specifically, this result is driven by individuals from high socioeconomic backgrounds. However, the additional years of education do not translate to degree completion; I find no discontinuity in percentage of degrees attained at the high school or college level. Strikingly, I also find no significant effect on employment or future earnings. The results are robust to different bandwidths and estimation procedures.
I then analyze several competing hypotheses as to why conscription would increase years of education but not earnings. On the one hand, if conscription has no direct effect on earnings, then my results imply zero returns to schooling. This could be the case if the average marginal return to education for those who were on the verge of dropping out of education is low, or because any positive returns to education in France may be mostly due to sheepskin effects and signaling, rather than human capital accumulation.
2 On the other hand, if we believe that conscription has a direct negative effect on earnings, reasonable assumptions regarding the magnitude of that effect from the existing literature, this results in returns to education estimates of 2.5 to 5 percent. Additional evidence provides support for the zero returns to education hypothesis.
In addressing the impacts of conscription on education and labor market outcomes, this paper joins a growing body of research on peacetime conscription. Imbens & Van der Klauw (1995) focus on the labor market effects brought about by peacetime conscription in the Netherlands and find a 5 percent negative return to earnings as a result of military service.
They attribute this result to the corresponding loss of labor market experience . Galiani et. al (2011) uncover a negative earnings effect brought about by serving in the Argentinian military service. They conclude that this helps explain the documented increase in draftees' criminal behavior. On the other hand, Card & Cardoso (2012) find evidence of positive military service effects on earnings. Specifically, they find a 4-5 percent increase in the wages of men with only primary education in Portugal. Cipollone & Rosolia (2007) focus on educational effects and find that exemption from service leads to a 3 percentage point reduction in high school graduation rates in Italy. Di Pietro (2009) also analyzes the educational effects of conscription in Italy by looking at university enrollment. The paper finds evidence of heterogeneous enrollment effects based on socioeconomic status. Grenet et al. (2011) and Bauer et al. (2012) examine the effect of peacetime military service on long run earnings of post World War II conscripts in England and Germany respectively. Both papers find no evidence of a long run earnings effect to conscription. Further, Grenet et al. (2011) uncover no evidence of draft avoidance behavior in terms of increased educational attainment in England, whereas Bauer et al. (2012) find that this behavior did exist in
Germany.
This paper is most similar to Maurin & Xenogiani (2007) who examine the effect of conscription policy on both labor market and educational outcomes in France. They find that this policy leads to an increase in educational attainment, graduation rates and earnings.
This study differs from Maurin & Xenogiani (2007) in several ways. First, I use the official birth date of January 1, 1979 as the cutoff for military service eligibility, whereas their study incorporates individuals born in 1978 in addition to 1979 in the treatment group. Second, I use a RD design which relies on less stringent assumptions as compared to a differences in difference model that compares across genders, which could be problematic to the extent that the educational decisions of men may affect those of women in a general equilibrium framework.
3 Third, I look at wages for individuals in their early 30s, which could potentially be more informative than entry wages examined in that paper. As a result, both papers reach different conclusions. More specifically, while we both uncover evidence of draft avoidance in terms of years of schooling, I find no evidence of a conscription effect on either graduation This paper makes several contributions relative to the existing literature. First, I present estimates that speak to the impact of conscription policy on both education and labor market outcomes. Particularly, I do so using a compelling research design that enables me to estimate the causal impact of conscription policy under assumptions that are less stringent than for many other research designs. This appears to be important, as this design yields no evidence of graduation effects or an earnings premium, which contrasts with previous work on the impact of conscription in France. In addition, because this study examines the impact of conscription using recent data on a relatively young cohort, it is particularly relevant for those countries in Western Europe that are considering changing their conscription policies.
This paper also adds to the much broader literature on education. Existing studies on the returns to education have mostly focused on exogenous variations in the supply of schooling and have generally found a positive returns to education (See Card (1999) for a survey of the literature). This paper focuses on a policy that induced variation in educational attainment through an increase in the demand for education. More specifically, conscription policy gave students an added incentive to pursue education-independent of the usual incentives to acquire more education. I find that the marginal student induced into acquiring education, due to conscription, does not seem to benefit from this added education. Specifically, while education has positive effects in general, we should still be wary of certain policies that induce individuals to attain more schooling than they would have had if it were up to them. This is consistent with recent findings by Pischke & Von Wachter (2008) and Grenet (2013) who document zero to little returns to education using variation from compulsory schooling laws in Germany and France respectively.
Section II presents more information on mandatory military service and subsequent re-4 I must acknowledge however that a direct comparison of both papers, specifically with respect to earnings estimates, could potentially be problematic. Differences in labor market outcome estimates across both studies may be attributed to conscription having a differential affect on early career wages for males in their early 20's versus longer term wages for those in their mid 30's. This is consistent with Angrist (1990) ; Angrist and Chen (2011) who initially finds a negative earnings impact to military service in the short run with these effects dissipating over time in the long run. 5 forms in France. Section III describes the data used in this paper. Section IV reviews the identification strategy. Section V presents the main empirical results as well as robustness checks. Section VI relates the findings to the returns to education literature. Section VII concludes.
Mandatory military service in France and subsequent reforms
France was the first modern state to introduce military conscription as a condition of citizenship during the French Revolution. It did so through the decree of the Jourdan Act of 1798 which stated "Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of the nation."
Conscription continued in various forms over the next 200 years until finally being phased out between 1996 and 2002. Individuals were called up for national service at age 18. In theory, one could postpone his service until the age of 22 without justification, though this was not usually done in practice. Instead, delaying conscription through acquiring extra education was the preferred route for several reasons. First, getting a full time job before conscription would require looking for a job twice. Second, more educated conscripts had access to higher responsibilities and milder forms of service. Further, staying on in education till the age of 26 allowed you to potentially avoid service all together. Finally, the abundance of low cost public schools, universities and technical/vocational institutions in France made it relatively easy to prolong education. In fact, Maurin & Xenogiani (2007) show that approximately two thirds of individuals enrolled in military service at time t, were still in school at t-1, whereas about 20% were unemployed and only 8% held permanent employment. They also show that the proportion of conscripts serving in the military aged 20 or older was 64%, with 90% of high school graduates serving after age 20.
International criticism over the performance of French deployed soldiers during the Gulf War caused the government to rethink their military service composition. This prompted 6 a national wide debate over whether or not national defense should be left to the hands of professionals only. On February 22, 1996, President Jacques Chirac dramatically restructured the French army with the intent of having fully professional armed forces by 2002.
A few months later, the president announced the end of conscription-the 1997 reform law granted national service exemption to men born after January 1, 1979 1, . During the 1997 1, -2002 transition period, men born before January 1979 were still required to perform 10 months of service. Compulsory military service was completely eliminated by a resolution adopted at the Cabinet meeting on June 27, 2001 which finally exempted those born before January 1, 1979 as well. The way these reforms were set up provides for an ideal quasi-experimental setup to test for the effects of conscription policy on education and future labor market outcomes. respectively. This drop is consistent with the way conscription was abolished in France.
5 The criteria for being included in Generation 1998 are as follows: 1) Enrollment in an educational institution in France in 1997-1998 or having left the education system in 1998. 2) No interruption in one's education exceeding a year (except for reasons of health, national service). 3) Having not returned to school during the year following entry into the labor market 4) Being at most 35 years old in the year 1998. 5) Being in France at the time of the survey.
6 General exemptions were given to males with mental or health issues. Other possible exemptions include married men who had children and whose spouses had limited resources, family members of military martyrs, non-citizens as well as individuals with dual citizenship who had lived abroad for a significant portion of time.
7 After the announcement of the military reform law in 1996 the number of individuals serving in the military gradually dropped from around 200,000 in 1996 to zero in 2002. means that all other determinants of outcomes must be smooth across the cutoff. This is likely to hold, as precisely manipulating one's date of birth in such a short time period is highly unlikely. Moreover, no other policy changes were occurring at the birth cohort threshold. To support these claims, I show that there is no evidence of bunching around the threshold, that observed determinants of education and earnings are smooth across the threshold and that treatment estimates do not significantly change with the addition of covariates. Accordingly, any discontinuity observed in 1979 can be attributed to the causal effect of being born before January 1, 1979, and thus being subject to the mandatory conscription policy. Formally, I estimate the following reduced form equation:
Where the dependent variable Y is the outcome of interest. D is a dummy variable indicating whether a person belongs to a pre-reform cohort or not (i.e. being born before I use population survey weights in order to estimate the treatment parameter τ for the various outcomes. 12 Further, standard errors are clustered at the month-year level as suggested in Lee & Card (2008) . 13 There are two ways to estimate the parameter τ . First, one can choose a parametric function for f(.) (eg. a quadratic or quartic polynomial in B) and use all the data available to estimate the equation above via ordinary least squares-typically referred to as the global polynomial approach. Alternatively, one can specify f(.) to be a linear function of B and estimate the equation over a narrower range of data, using a local linear regression. The latter approach can be viewed as generating estimates that are more local to the threshold and does not impose any strong functional assumptions on the data.
While the preferred specifications in this paper are drawn from local linear regressions using uniform kernel weights, I still present results for a variety of bandwidths and functional forms, as has become standard in the RD literature (Lee & Lemieux, 2010) .
In what follows, I rely on intent to treat (ITT) estimates and only report reduced form results. The reason I do so is twofold: First, the discontinuity in conscription rates at the cutoff does not really affect educational outcomes as it is eligibility for conscription rather than conscription in itself that drives those results. Second, re-weighing the reduced form estimates for labor market outcomes by the discontinuity in conscription rates in a Two Sample Two-Stage Least Squares framework (TS2SLS) relies on a tenuous exclusion restriction, seeing as conscription eligibility has a dual effect on education and earnings.
Education
I first examine the impact of mandatory conscription on years of education. Relatively older cohorts to the far left of the cutoff systematically have less education.
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Further, younger cohorts to the far right of the cutoff may still be in school. Panel B fits the data over a narrower bandwidth of 23 months using a local linear regression. Results indicate a significant 0.62 increase in years of education. 16 The optimal bandwidth for the local linear regression was selected using a robust data driven procedure (Henceforth CCT).
17
I also report local linear estimates over a wide array of bandwidths as to avoid over-reliance on a specific bandwidth choice, the results of which can be found in Panel C of Figure 1 .
Corresponding regression estimates are shown in Table 3 . All standard errors are clustered at the month-year level. Panel A depicts discontinuity estimates using different band-14 One may worry that the presence of too many people returning to education after military service would cause us to overstate any education effects. However, Maurin & Xenogiani (2005) show that only 4% of people who were in conscription at time t-1 pursued education at time t.
15 The Labor force survey indicates that both males and females born during that period had lower educational attainment as compared to relatively younger generations 16 The results from the global polynomial and local linear regressions are not statistically different from each other.
17 As outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik (forthcoming) , this bandwidth selector improves upon previous selectors that yield large bandwidths. Specifically, it accounts for bias-correction stemming from large initial bandwidth choice, while also correcting for the poor finite sample performance attributed to this bias correction. For instance, the LS-CV approach as outlined in Imbens & Lemieux (2008) gives an optimal bandwidth of 29 months.
widths and functional forms without the addition of controls. These estimates range from 0.41 to 0.62 years of extra education and are all statistically significant at the 5% level. The addition of controls does not significantly change the estimates, which is consistent with the identifying assumption. The controls used include birth month fixed effects, a binary variable indicating whether an individual was ever enrolled in middle school and father's occupation. Treatment estimates with controls are shown in Panel B and range from 0.35 to 0.55 years of education and are also statistically significant at the 5% level. In Figures A1 and A2 of the appendix, I account for the addition of these exogenous controls by plotting the residuals from years of education regressions. I conclude that conscription policy lead to a 6-month increase in education for young French males. These results are in line with a draft avoidance hypothesis (i.e. acquiring extra education to avoid military service).
Next, I examine whether this increase in years of education resulted in an increase in degree attainment, as measured by high school and college graduation rates.
18 Figures 2 and 3 show no evidence of a discontinuity in either college (0.0267) or high school (0.0034) graduation rates using a quartic fit over a bandwidth of 108 months. Table 4 depicts estimates for varying bandwidths and functional forms, with all results remaining statistically insignificant. In summary, I find that while mandatory conscription significantly increases years of education, it does not increase the likelihood of receiving a degree at the high school or college level.
Labor market outcomes
I now turn to whether this increase in education quantity for those barely subject to depicts an insignificant 1.5 percentage point intensive margin change in monthly earnings.
Finally, one may worry about whether monthly wages are not properly measuring effective salary dynamics due to behavioral responses in hours worked. I check for this by looking at any treatment effects on hourly wages. As can be seen from Panel D, I find no such effects and conclude that there are no significant changes in average earnings brought about by conscription. Corresponding regression estimates for all labor market outcomes are shown in Table 5 . The results remain statistically insignificant over varying bandwidths and functional forms. I conclude that the conscription policy had no effect on labor market outcomes, despite the significant increase in years of education that it caused.
To assess conscription eligibility effects on the distribution of earnings as opposed to just average earnings, I also run quantile treatment effect regressions on monthly earnings for the whole population of interest. I estimate treatment effects on the probability of having earnings in each of 9 exhaustive groups. The quantile treatment effects suggest insignificant estimates at all deciles of the income distribution, which are consistent with the average treatment effects. Results are presented in Figure A3 of the appendix.
19 I also re-estimate the global polynomial using a cubic and quartic fit and reach the same conclusion.
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Heterogeneous treatment effects
While the above results show that conscription policy increases years of education on average, there are reasons to believe that some men should be more affected than others.
For instance, individuals from wealthier backgrounds may find it easier to support themselves if they choose to prolong education. Thus, in order to complement the initial results, I look at treatment effects for individuals from high versus low socioeconomic backgrounds to assess if one was differentially affected by this policy. 20 Table 6 depicts results for global polynomial and local linear estimates. The bandwidth varies with each outcome variable when reporting the local linear estimates which are again chosen by the CCT bandwidth selector.
Results indicate that there is no significant change in added years of education for low S.E.S individuals, as can be seen in columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 . In contrast, I find that high S.E.S individuals take on significantly more education. Specifically, in columns 5 and 7, I estimate a significant treatment effect to the order of 0.57 and 0.96 years of education, depending on the estimation procedure used. These results are consistent with a priori expectations, seeing as resources play an integral role in prolonging one's education. 21 However, treatment effects on high school and college graduation rates remain statistically insignificant for both subgroups. This suggests that even though individuals from more affluent backgrounds were taking on more education, this did not affect the average graduation rate of this subpopulation. As for labor market outcomes, there are no significant treatment effects on the likelihood of employment for either group. I also estimate a zero treatment effect for the two subgroups with respect to monthly, hourly, and logged wages. I conclude that mandatory military service has no effect on labor market outcomes for individuals from both spectra of the socioeconomic realm, even though it induced individuals from high S.E.S to take on more education.
20 Differential selection into mandatory conscription by socioeconomic status could potentially bias these results. However, as shown in Table 1 , I find no evidence of this.
21 These costs can be direct (tuition, books, transportation, etc...) or indirect (opportunity cost of not being employed).
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Robustness Checks
In this section, I test the reliability and validity of the identification strategy used. One advantage of a RD design is that there are several tests that allow us to indirectly test the plausibility of the research design. For instance, non-random sorting of individuals to either side of the January 1, 1979 birth cutoff would cause identification issues. Specifically, if individuals are strategically sorting to the right of the threshold in order to avoid conscription, and if this sorting is correlated with future outcomes, then the estimated treatment effects would be biased. However, manipulation of birth certificates would be an extremely hard thing to achieve in a developed nation such as France. Moreover, the fact that this policy was announced in 1996 makes it hard to believe that people would be able to manipulate birth documents in such a short period of time with such ease. Figure 5 depicts the distribution of observations in the sample, with no large mass evident to the right of the cutoff.
22
Another informative visual test of manipulation involves testing for the smoothness of predetermined characteristics that are known to affect both earnings and education. The intuition here is that if we observe any discontinuity in exogenous characteristics, then this could be the result of strategic sorting by individuals or evidence of another policy occurring at the threshold. I test for this by examining where there is a documented discontinuity in fathers' occupation or in middle school enrollment rates.
23 Results depicted in Figures 6 and 7 confirm that there is no significant discontinuity in either of these baseline covariates.
The robustness of these results to varying bandwidths and functional forms are presented in Table 7 .
In addition, I perform several falsification exercises. I start by checking for discontinuities among females, who did not have to serve in the military. Specifically, I worry about there 22 There is slight variation from month to month which is easily explained by the nature of the data (survey) and by the fact that data was trimmed by removing females, non-citizens, individuals living abroad, etc...
23 Middle school enrollment rates should not be affected by the policy since those students are not yet eligible for conscription. Further, I do not focus on middle school graduation rates as that variable could potentially be endogenous to treatment in a dynamic choice model, seeing that passing the Brevet exam (middle school exit exam) or its equivalent is needed to stay enrolled in high school education and potentially delay one's service.
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also being any positive treatment effects for females born just before the cutoff date. If males and females born just before Jan.1, 1979 both experience a significant and positive shock, then one may be concerned about some other policy driving the results. Panels A to F in Figure 8 confirm that there is no discontinuity in years of education, graduation rates, employment or wages for young French females. To investigate the robustness of these global polynomial estimates, I report all outcomes over varying bandwidths and functional forms in Table 8 . All outcomes remain statistically insignificant except for high school graduation. High school graduation treatment effects yield a significant discontinuity in most specifications ranging from -4.8 to -8.2 percentage points. Even though these results are not robust to various bandwidths, I cannot reject the existence of a significant and negative treatment effect in the likelihood of graduating from high school for females born just before the cutoff. The two most plausible explanations for this effect are as follows:
First, there may have been another exogenous shock-specific to the conscription birth date threshold-that negatively affected the high school graduation rate of both genders. This would cause us to potentially understate high school graduation effects for young males subject to conscription. To the best of my knowledge, no such policy relative to that specific birth cohort exists.
24 An alternative, and more likely scenario, is that the increase in female high school graduation rates for those born after the cutoff date may be the result of peer effects stemming from gender composition in the classroom. That is, having less males remain in educational capacities would automatically lead to an increase in the proportion of females in the classroom. This could ultimately influence the educational performance of females in the classroom. This is consistent with Black et al. (2013) who find that teenage schooling outcomes are influenced by the proportion of females in the grade, with effects differing by gender. These results also highlight a serious pitfall in using a difference-in-difference strategy, with females as the control group, when analyzing the effects of conscription.
Finally, I check for discontinuities at pseudo cutoff dates around the original threshold.
24 I also check for discontinuities in high school graduation for both genders during the cutoff years of 1977, 1978 and 1980 and find no significant effects.
To do so I estimate treatment effects for 50 fake cutoff months on either side of the real threshold. This placebo test is implemented using years of education as the dependent variable since it is the only significant treatment effect found. Results indicate that the real cutoff date provides for the largest and most significant discontinuity. Figure 9 summarizes these findings by graphing t-statistics for these various placebo cutoff dates. The zero cutoff point represents the real threshold with all others being placebo estimates for months relative to the original being used as simulated treatment.
25 All significant estimates are highlighted in the graph with a large red filled circle. It is comforting to know that the most significant treatment effect occurs at the real cutoff month-year with a t-statistic of around 3. Further, I observe another 5 significant estimates out of the remaining 100 fake cutoff months.
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These t-stats decrease the further we are from the real cutoff birth date. This provides further evidence that the significant treatment effect on years of education is in fact caused by conscription.
What does this mean for returns to education?
So far I have estimated reduced form effects for both education and labor market outcomes. I find evidence of a discontinuity in years of education, but not in the probability of getting a high school or college degree. Further, there are no significant effects on labor market outcomes. However, because conscription can have its own effect on labor market outcomes, interpreting these results as evidence for the lack of returns to education would only be true under certain assumptions. Below I present a simple conceptual framework that allows us to draw the distinction between "traditional" and "conscription confounded"
returns to education estimates.
To simplify, let us assume that birth date (B) is the only factor that determines eligibility 25 Each month represents a local linear regression of bandwidth = 24 months using years of education as the dependent variable.
26 This is consistent with a Type-1 error of 5% assume that schooling (S = S(e)) is an increasing function of eligibility. 28 Finally, assume that wage (W = W(S(e), C(e)) is a function of schooling and conscription.
By a simple application of the chain rule, the reduced form effect of conscription eligibility on wages can be decomposed into a schooling effect and a conscription effect:
Rearranging (1):
Consistent with the previous literature on the topic, I focus on two general cases. Conscription can either have a zero or negative effect on wages.
29
Case1 :
Assuming that serving in the military (C) has no direct effect on wages, equation (2) reduces to a traditional returns to education interpretation and is just the ratio of reduced form estimates for wages and years of education. Put differently, this is equivalent to using date of birth as an instrument for education to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) for the returns to education. From the results section we know that
indicating that the results point to no labor market returns for half a year of education. This result is consistent with findings by Pischke & Von Wachter (2008) and Grenet (2013) who document zero to minor returns to education using variation from compulsory schooling laws in Germany and France respectively. The former study concludes that the skills most relevant 27 For ease of computation, think of conscription and eligibility as probabilities on a continuous scale from 0 to 1 as opposed to a binary variable.
28 The assumption imposes the constraint of conscription in itself having no direct effect on education, which is a reasonable one to make seeing that only 4 % of students ever return to education after having served. 29 In fact, almost all French individuals interviewed in a recent study agreed that there were no advantages to be gained from including military service experience on your curriculum vitae (Jorgensen & Breitenbauch (2009). for the labor market are learned early on in Germany. On the other hand, Grenet (2013) provide an explanation based on academic credentials. Particularly, they document that countries such as England and Wales witnessed a surge in graduation rates after increasing the age of compulsory schooling, whereas no such effect was documented in France. They hypothesize that policies that do not induce an uptake in academic credentials may not necessarily result in positive returns to education.
One explanation for the lack of educational returns in my study is that the average marginal return to education for those who were on the verge of dropping out of education is low. That is, the type of education induced by draft avoidance is of a lower quality than typical education or the marginal student induced into education exerts less effort. Alternatively, since this increase in years of education for the eligible group is not accompanied by a significant increase in college or high school graduation rates, then perhaps the results could be attributed to the value of signaling in education. The latter scenario is consistent with Grenet (2013) and suggests that most of the returns to education for the population of interest seem to be stemming from sheepskin effects (signaling) as opposed to human capital acquisition in the form of additional years of education.
Case2 :
Assuming that conscription has a negative effect on wages, then equation (2) no longer simplifies to a traditional returns to education interpretation. However, a bound for plausible returns to education estimates can be derived from equation (2). We know thatd ≈ 2.5% − 5% negative returns to conscription. Plugging these estimates into equation
(2), I estimate a bound to the order of ∂W ∂S ≈ 2.5% − 5% returns to an additional year of 30 Some may question why this number is at odds with the conscription rates for the years 1978 and 1979-reported in Table 1 . As mentioned in section 2, one of the criteria for inclusion in the Generation 1998à 10 ans survey is being in an educational institution in 1998. Thus, people who were not in education in 1998 or who had not left education by 1998 are excluded from the sample. These individuals likely have high service rates, which means Table 1 potentially underestimates conscription rates for some cohorts. As a result, we rely on a less conservative estimate of 50% at the cutoff.
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education for the population of interest.
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In order to shed light on which of these possible interpretations is more likely to be true, I look at two subgroups whose education decisions are exogenous to treatment. As highlighted in section 5.4, there is no threshold crossing effect on education for individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds. On the other hand, I observe a treatment effect on years of education for individuals coming from high socioeconomic backgrounds. However, both these groups experience no significant labor market treatment effects. As a result, and under the assumption of homogeneous conscription effects, serving does not seem to be directly affecting labor market outcomes.
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To complement these results, I also look at another subpopulation whose education is orthogonal to treatment but who are ultimately still eligible for conscription. Specifically, I
restrict the data to people who have only completed primary schooling (i.e up to grade 6).
These individuals' decision to not remain in school should be independent of conscription policy. Figure A4 confirms that there is no discontinuity in years of education for this subgroup. As a result, any discontinuity in earnings must be due to the effect of conscription itself, rather than to the combination of military service and increased education. Results are shown in Figure A5 , which shows no effect on earnings. While these results are more suggestive than conclusive given I am focusing on a very specific subgroup of individuals, they reinforce the conclusion that service has no direct effect on earnings.
Additionally, the main hypothesized channel-in the conscription literature-through which military service affects earnings is through a loss of early labor market experience (Angrist, 1990; Imbens and Van Der Klauw, 1995) . Figure A6 indicates that conscription policy does not induce a loss of early job market experience despite it leading to an increase in years of education. This finding is consistent with the proposed evidence suggesting zero 31 This bound is calculated assuming a compliance ratio of 50%. Assuming a more conservative 25% compliance ratio at the cutoff, the bound becomes 1.25%-2.5% returns to a year of education.
32 If individuals from high S.E.S reap some direct economic benefit from conscription relative to low S.E.S individuals, then this conclusion may not hold. However, the only cases in the literature where conscription has shown to have a positive impact on earnings were for individuals from less educated and/or disadvantaged backgrounds (Berger and Hirsch 1983; de Tray 1982) . 
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the returns to conscription literature by exploiting the abolition of mandatory military service in France in order to identify the effects of conscription eligibility on education and future earnings. I use a regression discontinuity design to overcome selection bias attributed to serving in the military. I find that those barely eligible for conscription obtain approximately 6 additional months of education as a result. Specifically, I find that this result is mainly driven by individuals from high socioeconomic backgrounds.
However, there are no discontinuities in high school or college graduation rates, which suggests that the individuals do not use the additional time in school to finish degrees. Furthermore, I find no effects on employment rates, monthly, hourly or logged earnings. These results are robust to varying bandwidths and functional forms.
I also contribute to the returns to education literature by presenting several hypotheses that could plausibly be driving the above results. If we assume no direct returns to serving in the military, then the ratio of the two reduced form effects yield a zero estimate for returns to education. On the other hand, if we were to assume negative returns to conscription, then the reduced form results do not simplify to a traditional returns to education interpretation.
Back of the envelope calculations result in a bound of 2.5%-5% returns to one year of education. Under the assumption of homogeneous returns to conscription, I provide evidence to the lack of any direct returns to conscription. This leans support to the zero returns to education hypothesis. No returns to schooling could be interpreted in several ways. First, the education induced by draft avoidance could be of lower quality than more typical education.
Alternatively, since there is no increase in high school or college graduation rates, then the results could be driven by signaling and sheepskin effects.
These results have important implications. First, while it remains an open question as to the extent to which these results would apply in other contexts, these findings could provide some evidence on the potential effects of mandatory military service in European countries that have yet to abolish such policies. Finally, we should be wary about the possible consequences of certain policies that induce individuals to attain more schooling than they would have had if it were up to them. In fact, a good portion of these individuals could probably be better served acquiring early labor market experience. More specifically, while the returns to education for non draft related reasons may still be positive, policies that aim to increase educational attainment without targeting the necessary complements of education need to be looked at closer. • Notes: High school graduation includes all forms of baccalaureate degrees (technical, professional, general) .
Sample includes French male citizens. All regression estimates are weighted by population. Standard errors are clustered at the birth-month year and reported in parentheses. Simulated treatment effects for various placebo cutoff months Significant estimates Insignificant estimates Figure 9 : Placebo test -T-statistics for reduced form effects on years of education using various fake cutoff dates.
Notes: Sample includes French male citizens. Each open circle represents the t-statistic from a local linear regression of bandwidth = 24 months using years of education as the dependent variable. Month Zero is the 'real' cutoff date, and I simulate 50 fake cutoff months to the right and left of that point. Clustered standard errors used to compute all t-stats. All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of age in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level and reported in parentheses. All regressions have been weighted by population. Our preferred specification is the one using bandwidth of 23 months which has been computed using the method proposed in Calonico et. al (2013) . Controls include: 1) Birth month fixed effects 2) A binary variable for middle school enrollment 3) father's occupation. *** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1 • Notes: Sample includes French male citizens. All regression estimates are weighted by population.
B Tables
Standard errors are clustered at the birth-month year and reported in parentheses. Controls used include month of birth fixed effects, a dummy for middle school enrollment as well as father's occupation. • Notes: Sample includes French male citizens eligible for conscription. All regression estimates are weighted by population. Standard errors are clustered at the birth-month year and reported in parentheses. Figure A8 : Organization of higher education routes in France.
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